Chapter 37 – Charles
Regarding the timing of landing events, some accounts conflict, but the following times are referenced:
4:05am – first streak of dawn – ANZAC HQ war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/25/1 pt 1, p21
4:10am – signal made to destroyers to come on – ANZAC HQ war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/25/1 pt 1, p21
4:30am – firing heard – on the beach – ANZAC HQ war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/25/1 pt 1, p21
4:32am – rifle fire was heard from the shore – ANZAC 1st Division war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/42/3 pt 1, p.14
5:10am – Majors Glasfurd and Villiers-Stuart and landed (time quoted as ‘5.25 or 5.10?’) – ANZAC 1st Division war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/42/3 pt 2, p.54
5:15am – Major Glasfurd sent note by boat recommending troops land in the cove for shelter. Then climb up to MacLagan and fix rendezvous points – Action signals. General Staff (quoted by Harvey Broadbent, The Boys Who Came Home , p. 60)
5:35am – ANZAC commander, Lieutenant-General Birdwood reported to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (M.E.F.) Headquarters that 4000 men had been landed at beach z – M.E.F. HQ war diary – AWM4 1/4/1 part 1, p.38.
5:40am – sunrise – ANZAC HQ war diary for 25 April – AWM4 1/25/1 pt 1, p21
Regarding the timing of dawn, daylight savings now in place in Turkey from the end of March to the end of October.
http://www.timeanddate.com/time/change/turkey/istanbul
However, daylight savings was not in place in Turkey in 1915. Germany was the first country to use daylight savings in 1916:
http://www.timeanddate.com/time/dst/history.html
Modern day ANZAC dawn services start at 5:30am, daylight savings time. This is the equivalent of 4:30am in 1915 without day light savings (i.e. the time of the first landing and first shots fired):
http://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac/dawn/
“Landing effected 237W…find MacLagan” Quoted by Harbey Broadbent in The Boys Who Came Home , p. 60, in a table of “Action Signals—General Staff”, sent from the beach at 5:15 by Major Glasfurd. The coordinates of 237W and 224B can be correlated to the Anzac landing map (AWM G7432G1S65V2F) and represent an area just to the north of Anzac Cove, at the southern end of North Beach. Hugh Dolan states in 36 Days that Charles Villiers-Stuart wrote the note (p. 369).
However, Charles Bean confirms that Majors Glasfurd and Villiers-Stuart were jointly responsible to land early together and determine the rendezvous and forming up locations. Major Charles Villiers-Stuart’s actions with Major Glasfurd on the morning of the landing are described by Charles Bean in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, vol I . Some details and times quoted conflict slightly with war diary accounts. Following are some quotes from Bean:
“The written orders provided that, when the 2nd Brigade landed, it should be met by one of the two staff officers—Major Glasfurd, of the 1st Australian Divisional or Major Villiers-Stuart of the Corps. These two were to land earlier, and their first duty was to choose four convenient forming up places near to the beach but clear of it, and two larger areas of rendezvous, one north and the other south of the landing-place.”, p.262
“MacLagan had his headquarters near the top of one of the gullies leading to Plugges...MacLagan left that headquarters to follow the 9th and 10th across the valley…”, p. 363
“The two guides, Glasfurd and Villiers-Stuart, had landed at 5:35am…Glasfurd had climbed the hill straight to MacLagan’s headquarters.”, p. 363
“Glasfurd decided that the first forming-up places should be in the gullies immediately above the Beach, for the reason that these afforded cover against the shrapnel from Gaba Tepe which burst intermittently over the landing-place. He then hurried over the knoll at the southern end of the Beach into Shrapnel Gully; and partly in the level scrub of the valley near its mouth, partly on the rear slope of the Razorback opposite, he fixed the rendezvous. This slope was always fairly sheltered…” p.363-4
The question of exactly where the ANZAC forces were intended to land, and whether the landing was mistakenly in the wrong place has been debated for 100 years and no doubt will continue to be so. The original official view presented by Ian Hamilton in the Dardanelles commission was that the landing was in the wrong place. However, it is important to remember that he was fighting to clear his name after the military disaster, so his statements must be treated with caution. The official history recorded by Charles Bean in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol I, supports the view that the landings were in the wrong place, blaming a strong current on p. xi (or p. xlv in the later University of Queensland edition). On p. 255 Bean states “The men were ashore and mostly alive, but the place was clearly the wrong one.” Map 10 on p. 251 shows the intended and actual landing places, and a sketch map on p. 255 shows the actual landing locations as compared with the intended routes following landing. In each map case the intended landing place is shown as being to the south of the actual landings.
However, Kevin Fewster summarises a more recent historical school of thought in Bean’s Gallipoli, The Diaries of Australia’s Official War Correspondent as follows: “…recent researchers tend to agree that the landing spot was probably changed at the last minute due to strong Turkish defences at the designated beach and the relative protection afforded by the steep cliffs of what became known as Anzac Cove.” (p. 78)
An explanation of the theories and evidence in relation to the ANZAC landing location is provided by Harvey Broadbent in The Boys Who Came Home , p. 41-47. Broadbent states that “For any serious researcher the Gallipoli Campaign, and the landings particularly, are a frustrating subject. Apart from the lack of information from the commanders, no full record of the landings apparently exists…Documents that do exist, however, provide enough information to make some intelligent assumptions (though assumptions they must remain) about whether Anzac Cove was the intended landing place…The impreciseness of the landing orders gave Birdwood the opportunity to make adjustments to where exactly he could land his troops.” (pp. 42-43). An interview is recorded with former Midshipman William Sheffield-Williamson who states that he was in charge of a leading boat during the landing, that “We led them to the beach I was told to go to” and that there were “…No currents. It was a nice quiet morning, nothing much of a breeze, not enough to even sway the boats.”
Without explicitly stating a conclusive position, evidence is presented that strongly suggests Anzac cove was deliberately selected as the ANZAC landing place.
Hugh Dolan concludes in 36 Days , p. 374, that “The ANZAC landing at Z Beach has not enjoyed its rightful place in history. ANZAC achieved its set objectives by drawing the wrath of the Turkish 5 Army and providing the British a fighting chance of landing in front of the hornets’ nest of Cape Helles.”